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Introduction
Equity markets worldwide experienced a slump in the wake of the U.S. financial crisis. By the end of 2008, most equity indices had dropped to at least 50% of their 2006 levels (Bartram and Bodnar, 2009 ). There was also an unprecedented reduction in international trade and capital flows (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011; Claessens et al., 2012) . The objective of this paper is to investigate through which channels the U.S. financial crisis affected equity returns in other developed and emerging countries and regions. The mainstream literature on crisis transmission conceptualizes both real (international trade) and financial linkages (capital flows) as observable factors that conform to the so-called fundamental channel, and unobservable factors such as panic, herd behavior and investor sentiment as conforming to the residual or non-fundamental channel. This paper focuses on the fundamental channels of crisis transmission.
As stressed by Forbes (2013) , "Much of the earlier literature focused on the fundamental question of whether contagion actually occurred during major crises …, still do not answer the fundamental question of why a negative shock is transmitted internationally and through what channels contagion occurs". Understanding the mechanisms of the international transmission of the U.S. financial crisis is of interest to academics and policymakers, as some lessons could be learned. Since 2009 many emerging markets such as Brazil, Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand have implemented financial supervision and regulatory reforms. The IMF has not only relaxed its opposition to capital controls but rather included them as one of various tools to limit financial vulnerability.
1 A good grasp of the role played by different crisis transmission channels is crucial for the design of appropriate policy responses.
On the one hand, if the worldwide equity market slump was mainly channeled through 1 Various arguments in favor of using capital controls in addition to macroprudential measures are put forward by the IMF in the staff position note of Ostry et al. (2010) . See also Rey (2013) .
cross-border capital flows (such as "fire-sells" by panicked international portfolio investors or temporary bank liquidity withdrawals) providing liquidity or financial assistance could potentially have eased the post-crisis adjustment. On the other hand, if the U.S. financial crisis spread to other countries through a reduction of international trade  materializing as economic losses for trade-relevant firms and, in turn, as stock value declines  then capital mobility controls and liquidity injections would have been far less effective. A rather different scenario is where the U.S. financial crisis transmission to worldwide equity markets might have been driven by a global meltdown in confidence (or pure contagion) in which case a greater emphasis should have been placed on structural reforms to restore confidence and on strengthening macroeconomic fundamentals to reduce vulnerabilities. 2 The transmission of the U.S. financial crisis more realistically occurred through a mix of fundamental and pure contagion channels.
This paper investigates the relative role of various fundamental channels -traditional financial (equity, bond and bank credit flows) and real economic (international trade) linkages.
Several aspects of our study differentiate it from extant research. First, we assess the relative importance of financial (equity, bond and bank credit) flows and international trade channels to exhaust all major fundamental channels. Second, we study the transmission role of capital flows and international trade in both net and gross terms since there is a strand of the literature which suggests that these two types of measures may convey different information regarding crisis transmission (Forbes and Warnock, 2012; Shin, 2012) . Third, we take account of country heterogeneity in the degree of financial/economic development and global financial market integration of our large cross-section of 36 countries in two ways. The analysis is conducted using time-series data averaged across countries in five groups. Following Forbes (2013), three of those groups are formed using income (IMF country classifications of April 2 Following Bekaert et al. (2014) the term pure contagion is used here to refer to the transmission channels of crises that do not involve the direct or tangible real economic and financial (fundamental) channels.
2012) as main criteria -Eurozone advanced countries (EU), other advanced economies (OAE),
and emerging markets (EM). The EM group includes some of the most dynamic and fastestgrowing economies in the world, such as China, India and Brazil. Since there is another strand of literature that focuses on Asian and Latin American countries (e.g., Bekaert et al, 2002 , Fuertes et al., 2015 , we also consider these two groupings by geographical location. Being mindful of some overlapping, we deliberately study these groups of countries to assess whether income or geographical location matters to the crisis transmission question. We also conduct the analysis at country level to allow for full country heterogeneity, as additional evidence.
3
As regards to the methodology, unlike the studies by Forbes (2013) and Kamin and DeMarco (2012) which are based on single-equation modeling approaches, we estimate vector autoregressive (VAR) models and generalized impulse response functions (GIRF) that are immune to the ordering of the variables in the VAR system. Specifically, we extend the VAR framework adopted by Froot et al. (2001) and Bekaert et al. (2002) in order to include not only equity flows and domestic equity returns, but also bond flows, bank credit, and international trade. One merit of the VAR framework is that it accommodates reverse causality between capital flows and equity returns as not only capital flows can drive equity returns (price pressure or information hypothesis), but also equity returns can further attract flows (return-chasing or momentum investing hypothesis). Following Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Forbes (2013), we include exogenous controls or push factors to account for global trends. 4 Finally, we obtain forecast error variance decompositions for equity returns from a recursive VAR model.
Due to the nature of our research question, we adopt a domestic country versus U.S.
bilateral perspective for a large cross-section of 36 countries including both emerging and 3 There is a parallel literature on crisis transmission at individual country level; see e.g. Frankel and Saravelos (2012) and Bussière et al. (2015) . 4 Traditionally, analyses of international capital flows involving multiple economies use the term 'push' to refer to global factors affecting all countries such as the U.S. interest rate and 'pull' to refer to domestic or country-specific factors such as domestic equity returns (see, e.g. Bekaert et al., 2002; Forbes and Warnock, 2012) .
developed economies. The sample covers the long period from January 1988 to December 2012.
We conservatively adopt January 2007 as threshold to split the sample period into two subperiods for comparison; the 'control' or 'pre-crisis' period is January 1988 to December 2006. 5 Among the different cross-border capital flows, we find that bank credit plays a significant role in the transmission of the U.S. financial crisis to equity markets, especially from the VARbased Granger causality tests and the variance decomposition analysis. The finding is more neatly revealed in the VAR models based on net capital flows and trade as opposed to gross capital flows and trade. Cross-border bank credit plays a significant role in the U.S. financial crisis transmission for all five country groups but the evidence is strongest (as consistently shown by the main VAR analysis and battery of robustness checks) for the EM group. The lagged effect of net bank credit on equity returns during the crisis period is particularly large for EMs, which aligns well with the fact that pre-crisis the net bank credit is on average large and positive for the EM group, exceeding that of other groups, and indicates large reliance on U.S. bank credit. The same applies to total capital flows, that is, the sum of equity, bond and bank credit, as they are dominated by the latter. The findings also reveal that, although the postsubprime crisis slump in equity markets was a pervasive phenomenon, for many countries the causality from fundamental capital flows and trade to equity returns is very tenuous and statistically insignificant. This suggests that other channels such as contagion in the form of "wake-up" calls, and contagion driven by market sentiments of panic and fear might have also contributed to the transmission of the U.S. financial crisis to equities.
Our paper complements a growing literature on the U.S. financial crisis transmission. (2006) show that equity flows are an important factor in the propagation of financial shocks across countries. Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) find a role in the recent crisis transmission for short-term debt in foreign currency. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012a, b, c) show that global banking plays a key role in the crisis transmission since a shock to the banking system of a country reduces its supply of credit to other countries. Tong and Wei (2011) ascribe a role to global banking via a reduction in lending by domestic banks following cross-border shocks to their balance sheets. Brière et al. (2012) find that "flight-to-quality" prevails in crisis and that contagion (defined as the increase in cross-market linkages after a shock) is an artifact of globalization. It has also been shown that international trade can transmit crisis through import demand and export competition (Glick and Rose, 1999; Claessens et al., 2012) .
By contrast, Spiegel (2010, 2011) find no evidence that international trade and financial linkages were the main channels of the U.S. financial crisis transmission. Kamin and DeMarco (2012) analyze industrial countries that held large amounts of U.S. mortgage-backed securities and find that neither foreign exposures to 'toxic' U.S. assets nor foreign vulnerability to dollar funding pressures can by themselves explain the crisis transmission. Bekaert et al. (2014) find instead that "wake-up calls" and domestic banking policies played an important role in the global transmission of the U.S. financial crisis. Our paper relates to another strand of the literature that studies the dynamics of disaggregated capital flows, and/or considers gross and net flow measures. Not all capital flows have the same degree of reversibility. Equity and bond flows have been historically more reversible than bank credit flows (Sarno and Taylor, 1999; Levchenko and Mauro, 2007; Tong and Wei, 2011) . But the amount of "hot money" in cross-border bank credit and hence, the degree of reversibility of bank credit flows, notably increases post-1990s as shown by Fuertes et al. (2015) . Also, even if a country's current account is relatively balanced, it may mask large gross inflows that are balanced by large gross outflows and so the country is still vulnerable to shocks (Gourinchas and Rey, 2007; Forbes and Warnock, 2012; Broner et al., 2013) . Shin (2012) argues that even when the net bank credit is balanced, the gross bank credit may be large and may transmit crisis, similar to portfolio flows.
Finally, in studying how financial events in the U.S. were transmitted globally to equity markets, our paper adds to Bartram and Bodnar (2009), Tong and Wei (2011) , Kamin and DeMarco (2012) and Forbes (2013) . Studying instead the transmission to CDS markets (as e.g., Eichengreen et al. 2012; Kamin and DeMarco, 2012 ) is precluded in our paper because CDS data is not so widely available in cross-section and time span. Nonetheless, there is high dependence between CDS premia and stock prices particularly in crisis (e.g., Fei et al., 2013) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the methodology and data. The main empirical results are discussed in Section 3, while and Section 4 provides a battery of robustness checks. Section 5 concludes with a summary and policy implications.
Methodology and data

VAR models
Our empirical analysis of the U.S. financial crisis transmission to equity markets is framed within the vector autoregressive (VAR) modeling approach. 6 The VAR model of order one that we adopt to analyze the dynamics of monthly time-series can be compactly written as
6 A VAR model of order p, denoted VAR (p), consists of n equations that express each of the n endogenous variables as a linear function of its own p lags and the p lags of the remaining n-1 variables. This is called reduced-form VAR because it can be cast as a reduced form of a dynamic economic system involving n variables with uncorrelated structural shocks (structural VAR with diagonal covariance matrix∑ ). The structural parameters can be obtained from the VAR parameters through the Choleski decomposition of ∑ which amounts to formulating a recursive VAR by imposing contemporaneous restrictions. The ordering = ( 1, , … , , )′ implies that 1, is not contemporaneously affected by any other variables, 2, is contemporaneously affected by shocks to the preceding variable 1, but not any others, and so forth. 7 We formulate the general specification , = + ( ) , −1 + ( ) + , where ( ) = 1 + 2 + ⋯ + −1 −1 and ( ) = 1 + 2 + ⋯ + −1 −1 are lag polynomial matrices corresponding to the endogenous and exogenous variables, respectively. The standard Ljung-Box test is employed to identify the lag parameter k needed to absorb all residual autocorrelation; the lag parameter j  k is subsequently chosen according to the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC). Allowing for lags up to 12 months, both criteria predominantly select k=j=1 in line with Dahlquist and Robertsson (2004 In both models, following Forbes (2013) and others, we include as exogenous variables the VXO equity volatility index, the S&P-GSCI commodity (total return) index and the 10-year Treasury yield. VXO is a forward-looking measure of "economic uncertainty" or "risk"
that captures both the riskiness of financial assets as well as global investor risk aversion. S&P-GSCI serves as broad indicator of economic conditions. The 10-year Treasury bond yield acts as proxy for long term global interest rates; 8 that is, ≡ ( , , ,10 )′.
The unknown parameters are the constants, the coefficients of the endogenous variables, and the coefficients of the exogenous factors which are collected, respectively, in the matrices
and the (co)variances of the white noise disturbances which are gathered in the matrix 8 VXO and VIX are highly correlated measures of market expectations of stock market volatility (see Forbes and Warnock, 2012) . VXO is an estimate of the at-the-money implied volatility on the S&P 100 equity index. VIX is an average of out-ofmoney option price volatility across all available strikes on the S&P 500 equity index. VXO is backdated to 1986 so it can be used in our control sample whereas VIX is only backdated to 1990. The total return S&P-GSCI measures the returns accrued from investing in fully collateralized nearby commodity futures. The commodity components qualify for inclusion in the index according to liquidity measures and are weighted in relation to their global production levels (see Rallis et al., 2013) .
Using aggregated monthly time-series across all countries (N=36) and across groups of countries, we estimate , , and ∑ by the ordinary least squares (OLS) method which is consistent and asymptotically efficient. We carry out individual country-by-country estimation of the VAR model parameters as one of several robustness checks below.
The inclusion of the U.S. Fed funds rate as one of the endogenous variables in the VAR system follows from Bekaert et al. (2002) and Rey (2013) . It is important to control for the effects on capital flows, trade and equity markets of the monetary policy adopted by the U.S.
in the aftermath of the crisis. There is evidence that ultra-expansive Fed policy tends to dampen investors' risk aversion and encourages hot money flows into emerging markets (Bruno and Shin, 2012; Bekaert et al., 2013; Rey, 2013; McKinnon, 2014) . The theoretical impact of monetary policy on trade is less obvious. On the one hand, U.S. expansionary policy is likely to stimulate U.S. import demand which would worsen the U.S. trade balance. However, an ultra-low Fed rate may weaken the international value of the U.S. dollar, which may decrease imports and increase exports and improve the U.S. trade balance. We initially conceptualize the Fed funds rate as endogenous but later (robustness tests) it is treated as exogenous.
Data description and preliminary analysis
We employ data on 15 emerging economies, 21 advanced economies (and the U.S.) from January 1988 to December 2012 (N=36 countries; T=300 months with a few exceptions as detailed in Table I ). The bilateral capital outflow and inflow data are obtained from the U.S. Table I provides summary statistics for all the flows expressed in net terms; the counterpart statistics for the gross variables are omitted, due to space constraints, but available from the authors upon request.
First, we begin by estimating the two VAR models described above using aggregate time series across the entire cross-section (N=36 countries) using both equal-weights and standardized value-weights. The latter are constructed from equity market capitalization data for December 2012 from the World Bank database. Second, in order to investigate whether intrinsic country characteristics play a role in the nature of the transmission we estimate the VARs using data aggregated across five country groups which are explained next.
As noted earlier, using income we group the countries as Eurozone advanced countries (EU), other advanced economies (OAE), and emerging markets (EM), and using geographical location as Asia and Latin America. The composition of each group is described in Table I .
[Insert Table I around here] this confirms that there is "no place to hide" from the crisis (Bartram and Bodnar, 2009 ).
[Insert Figure I around here] Unsurprisingly, the extent of the equity market collapse and subsequent recovery time varies from country to country. The U.S. equity market roughly went back to its early 2007 level before the end of the sample period in 2012, some EMs earlier than that, but most EU countries are by 2012 still below their pre-crisis levels. As suggested by the percentage equity price changes from January 2007 to January 2010 shown in Table II , the recovery rates differ across regions, faster for Latin American countries followed by Asian countries and EMs.
[Insert Table II around here]
The different dynamics of net and gross trade flows are illustrated in Figure II for Brazil and Philippines alongside exports (from the U.S.) and imports (to the U.S.). Philippines ranks well ahead of Brazil in terms of gross trade but their positions reverse with net trade as reflected also in the descriptive statistics of Table I . In both countries, net trade experiences an upward trend in the run-up to the U.S. financial crisis but gross trade trends downwards; the contrast is due to the fact that exports from the U.S. experience a downward trend but imports too and more sharply which is possible due to income and wealth effects in the U.S.
[Insert Figure 
Empirical results
We present results from various standard tools within the VAR framework that permit us to gauge from different angles the relative contributions of capital (equity, bond and bank credit) flows and international trade to the worldwide decline of equity returns post U.S. subprime crisis. Section 4.1 discusses the evidence from the VAR coefficient estimates and Granger causality tests. Section 4.2 discusses the findings from generalized impulse response functions and Section 4.3 discusses the forecast error variance decomposition. 
VAR model coefficients and Granger-causality tests
We begin by taking a look at the estimation results for the two VAR models, respectively, based 9 The software package STATA v.12 is employed to conduct the empirical analysis.
on gross and net capital flows and trade variables. Table III reports the coefficient estimates for the market return equation which, given the purposes of our investigation, is the main equation of interest. Panels I and II pertain to the pre-crisis and crisis periods, respectively. Columns (1) and (2) report VAR estimation results based on monthly observations averaged across the entire cross-section of 36 countries using equal-weights and value-weights, respectively. Columns (3) to (7) report the corresponding results for equally-weighted average data across EU, OAE, EM, Asian and Latin American groups.
[Insert Table III around here]
Next we conduct a standard t-test for the null hypothesis that gross equity flows (gross bond flows, gross bank credit or gross trade) do not Granger-cause equity returns; namely, the coefficient of the corresponding lagged variable in the equity returns equation is zero, Likewise, for the VAR model formulated with net variables. The corresponding test statistic for each hypothesis is shown in italics in Table III . Most of the rejections of the 'no Grangercausality (toward equity market returns)' hypothesis in the crisis period pertain to the bank credit flows and this result is robust to using gross versus net capital flow/trade variables.
The most noticeable contrast between the pre-crisis and crisis period pertains to the coefficients of lagged gross bank credit on equity market returns. While no causality is detected pre-crisis, the coefficient of lagged gross bank credit is significant and positive in many cases (country groupings) during the crisis period. This is plausible as it suggests that a decrease in gross bank credit during the crisis had an adverse impact on equity markets worldwide. This provides evidence that banks have played a dominant role in the U.S. financial crisis transmission to the rest of the world. The coefficient of lagged gross bank credit is significant and positive consistently for various country groupings; namely, in the VAR model estimated with equal-weighted time-series aggregated for all 36 countries, for EM and EU countries.
There is no evidence of Granger causality from gross bank credit flows to equity market returns during the crisis according to the VAR estimated with data averaged across all 36 countries using value-weights and for the (equal-weights) OAE group estimation; in fact, the concurrence of results in these two cases is plausible given that the largest equity markets (by value) tend to be those of OAEs as documented in Table I . There is no evidence of causality from gross bank credit to equity returns for the Asian and Latin American countries.
The coefficient estimates and Granger causality tests in the net terms VAR model, shown in Panel B of Table III , confirm the dominant role played by bank credit. 10 We observe that while lagged net bank credit has a muted effect on equity market returns during the pre-crisis period, it has a significant effect during the crisis period and the effect of bank credit dominates that of other fundamental channels of crisis transmission such as equity flows, bond flows and trade. The effect of lagged net bank credit on equity returns is significant and negative in the VAR model estimated with equally-weighted average data for OAE, EM, Asian and Latin American countries; the effect is strongest for EMs and Latin American countries. The coefficient of lagged net bank credit on equity market returns is significant and positive in the VAR model estimated with average (equal-weights) data for all 36 countries and EU countries.
The contrasting coefficient sign may relate to whether the corresponding country group is dominated by countries that are on the whole financed by the U.S. according to the value of net bank credit (or net capital flows, since the net bank credit notably exceeds the net equity and net bond flows) in which case a positive sign is plausible, or instead dominated by countries that are financing the U.S. in which case a negative sign is more plausible. In the wake of the U.S. financial crisis, not only U.S. banks withdraw their credit to other countries but also banks in other countries liquidate their investments in the U.S. at distressed or fire-sale prices and suffer losses in proportion to the position they deleverage "flight-to-quality" (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2008) , or "running for the exit" (De Haas and Van Horen, 2013) . The former leads to a drop of equity markets in other countries because of lack of foreign liquidity and thus a positive relationship between our defined "net bank credit" and local equity returns, while the later can also cause equity declines in the other countries because the crisis-affected domestic banks reduce lending to their domestic non-financial firms in their own countries in order to return to target leverage, and that creates a negative relationship between net bank credit and local equity returns. 11 The overall sign roughly depends on whether there is more bank credit from the U.S. to the other country (i.e., the other country is financed by the U.S.), or the other way around (i.e., the U.S. is financed by the other country). We conjecture a positive sign in the former case (the EU), but a negative sign in the latter case (the OAE, EM, Asia and LA).
More specifically, as Table I shows, half of the countries in the EU group rank top by positive net bank credit (i.e., countries mostly financed by the U.S.) and four prominent examples in terms of positive net bank credit are Finland, Netherlands, Ireland and France, which are precisely in the EU group for which a positive sign is found. On the other hand, the four biggest players among all 36 countries with negative net bank credit (i.e., outflows from the U.S. are outweighed by inflows to the U.S.; these are countries that are mostly financing the U.S.) are Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong and UK which are precisely in the OAE group for which a negative sign is found.
Since the main influence of lagged capital flows on month t-1 to equity market returns on month t is detected for bank credit, it is pertinent to scrutinize the evolution of monthly bank credit over the sample period. Figure Table I shows) and thus, they are being financed by the U.S. on the whole. TW and SP are chosen because they rank bottom according to net bank credit and total net capital flows (negative values) so they are financing the U.S. overall. Finally, the UK and HN are chosen because they rank top and bottom, respectively, in terms of gross bank credit and total gross capital flows.
[Insert Figure Moreover, the equity markets of those countries also fell sharply. This explains the negative effect of lagged net bank credit on equity returns for these country groups.
Generalized impulse response functions
Next we employ the framework of generalized impulse responses developed by Pesaran and Shin (1998) to analyze the effect of an unexpected one-standard-deviation shock to equity flows, bond flows, bank credit or trade on equity market returns. The GIRFs are constructed from an orthogonal set of innovations that is invariant to the ordering of variables in the VAR. Figure IV shows the cumulative impulse responses from the two VAR models with gross versus net capital flows and trade variables, respectively, estimated with aggregate (i.e., equalweighted averaged) data across countries. The sample period for the estimation is the crisis period defined conservatively to begin on January 2007 until December 2012.
[Insert Figure IV around here]
A unit shock in gross bank credit leads to a relatively large reaction in equity market returns of EM, EU and Latin American countries as shown in Panel C. The positive association confirms our previous finding that, during the crisis period, the sharp falls in equity markets were largely driven by corresponding declines in gross bank credit flows. The response of equity market returns to gross bank credit is more muted for Asian and OAE countries which, interestingly, rank ahead of the other country groups in terms of the magnitude of gross trade (as shown in Figure III , top left graph). Across all country groups, the response of equity returns is smaller in magnitude when gross equity flows or gross bond flows are shocked instead. Also across all country groups, a positive (negative) shock in gross trade leads to a decrease (increase) in equity returns which does not support the notion that trade transmitted the financial events in the U.S. globally to equity markets.
12
The lower half of Figure IV depicts the GIRFs based on net capital flows and trade. Once again, the reaction of equity market returns is relatively large in magnitude when the impulse 12 Our model can be seen as more completely specified for financial flows than trade flows. Trade flows have been the object of extensive analysis and there is consensus that trade flows behave rather differently from financial flows. Specifically, the trade dynamics is slower than that of financial flows: the Great Trade Collapse took place after the Great Retrenchment of financial flows, and may have coincided by the rebound in equity returns (see, e.g., Baldwin, 2009, and Bussière et al., 2013) . The results reported on Figure IV reflect these different dynamics.
pertains to the net bank credit. A positive shock to net bank credit has a largely persistent effect in the same direction on equity markets of EU countries and in the opposite direction on OAE, EM, Asian and Latin American countries. Irrespective of the sign, the effect is largest in magnitude for Latin American, EM and EU countries (see Panel G). This is plausible in the light of the net bank credit trend pre-crisis observed in the bottom left graph of Figure III; clearly, these three groups rank top in terms of the size of net bank credit (top reliant) which rationalizes their larger transmission effect. We find much smaller impacts of net portfolio (equity and bond) flows and international trade on local equity returns in the crisis period.
Forecast error variance decomposition
In this section, we assess the role of capital (equity, bond, bank credit) flows and international trade in transmitting the U.S. financial crisis to equity markets through a forecast error variance decomposition. This innovation accounting approach differs from the GIRFs in that it is based on the recursive re-formulation of the VAR model, with endogenous vector contrast with the Granger-causality tests and GIRFs, the variance decomposition is linked to the VAR ordering which imposes specific contemporaneous restrictions. The ordering adopted implies that the Fed rate (first) variable is affected within the same month by its own shocks but not by shocks to any of the country-specific capital flows and trade variables, the equity flow (second) variable is contemporaneously affected by its own shocks and by shocks to the Fed rate, and so on. Since we want to measure the impact of cross-border capital flows and trade shocks on equity market returns (which, by being ordered last in the VAR system, can potentially respond to any of the other endogenous variables), how the preceding variables are ordered is immaterial to the forecast error variance decomposition for the equity returns. Table IV shows the percentage of the total forecast error variance of equity returns at horizons of = {1, 6, 12} months that can be ascribed to capital flows and trade shocks. In spite of the stronger share of the variance that is attributable to the own equity return shocks, this variance decomposition is reminiscent of our previous results because it reveals a relatively tight link between equity market returns and cross-border bank credit.
[Insert Table IV around here] The recursive VAR model formulated in gross terms clearly reveals for three country groupings  EU, EM and Asian countries  that among capital (equity, bond and bank credit) flows and trade, the largest share of the variance of equity market returns corresponds to gross bank credit shocks. To illustrate, for the EU advanced economies as a whole, 16% of the forecast error variance 12 months ahead can be ascribed to gross bank credit shocks, 3% to gross equity flows, 0.4% to gross bond flows and 4% to gross trade shocks; the remaining corresponds principally to own equity market shocks (74%) and less so to the Fed rate (2%).
The recursive VAR model in net terms yields even more persuasive evidence of the predominant role of cross-border bank credit in transmitting the U.S. financial crisis to equity markets worldwide. The variance decomposition reveals almost uniformly across all five country groupings that net bank credit shocks are responsible for the largest share of the forecast error variance. Again to illustrate, for the EU advanced economies as a whole over 25%
of the 12-month ahead forecast error variance is due to net bank credit shocks, while only 4%
to net equity flows, 0.4% to net bond flows and 2% to gross trade shocks; the remaining variation is due to equity shocks (63%) and Fed rate shocks (5%).
As a whole, our examination of a large cross-section of 36 countries (vis-à-vis the U.S.)
over the period January 1988 to December 2012 thus far reveals that the dynamics of crossborder bank credit is a major driver of the slump in global equity markets that ensued the U.S. When these global banks are faced with a funding shock, they apply basic corporate finance principles by activating capital markets internal to the organization, reallocating funds across locations in response to their relative needs. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012c) confirm the existence of an active cross-border, internal capital market. In this internal funding allocation process, the parent bank is arguably most concerned with the net (as opposed to gross) bank credit flow positions at each specific location and their impact on the banking organization.
Robustness tests
Seeking to add robustness to our main findings, we reformulate the VAR models. The results are reminiscent of our main finding (from the VAR models estimated with average data across countries) of a predominant role for bank credit. The coefficients of the equity returns equation obtained through country-by-country estimation are shown in Appendix A as a "heat map"; light (or dark) grey shade indicates significant Granger causality from the corresponding variable to equity market returns at the 5% (or stronger 1%) level. The number of countries where cross-border net bank credit significantly causes equity returns increases fourfold from the pre-crisis to the crisis period, and the average coefficient of lagged bank credit in the market returns equation increases substantially from -0.097 to -0.600 for EMs. Table V.   13 Taken together, the main VAR estimation results reported in Table III together with the battery of robustness checks reported in Table V reveal that during the crisis period not only cross-border net bank credit plays a key role as driver of equity returns but there is also a consistent pattern in the relative magnitude of the effect of lagged bank credit on equity returns across groups. Generally, the largest coefficients of net bank credit pertain to the EM group followed by the Latin American countries (all five of which are also classified as EMs). The finding that the EM group stands out is aligned with recent studies that underline the impact of the recent financial crisis on EMs; see, e.g. Dooley and Hutchinson (2009) for EMs; a similar observation applies to total capital flows.
The correlation between the country VAR coefficient of lagged net bank credit in the equity market return equation (Appendix A) and the average net capital flows prior to the crisis (Appendix B) across all 36 countries is negative at -3.26%. This negative correlation tentatively suggests that capital outflows (i.e., positive net flows) in the pre-crisis period tend to be associated with large and negative coefficient estimates of net bank credit in the crisis period.
We also observe that, precisely, for the EM group (and the Latin American subgroup) the average net bank credit experiences a reversal, that is, it switches sign from positive (outflows) 13 As a by-product of our multi-equation VAR modeling approach, we find strong evidence that during the crisis period from January 2007 to December 2012 the coefficient of the lagged Fed rate in the net trade equation is significantly negative in the equally-weighted average data estimation for OAE, EM, Asian and Latin American countries; this evidence supports the "beggar-thy-neighbor" effect. The coefficients of lagged net equity, bond or capital flows in the net trade equation are mostly insignificant; only for the EM and Latin American groups the coefficient is significant and negative which only mildly reveals a "credit constraint" effect during the crisis.
in the pre-crisis sample period from January 1998 to December 2006 to negative (inflows) in the crisis period from January 2007 to December 2012. In fact, such switch from positive net bank credit to negative net bank credit for EMs is already observed in the last pre-crisis year (c.f. Panels I and II of Appendix B). The same observations apply to net capital flows as a whole. 14 It is then plausible to find for the EM countries  whose long-run average of capital flows prior to the crisis suggest relatively large reliance on bank credit outflows from the U.S.
 that their equity market returns are highly sensitive to the retrenchment of U.S. bank credit outflows in the aftermath of the subprime crisis.
Conclusions
This paper examines various plausible fundamental channels of transmission of the U.S.
financial crisis towards the equity markets of 36 countries using standard multi-equation timeseries modeling techniques. Using data sampled monthly from January 1988 to December 2012, we estimate vector autoregressive (VAR) models to capture the joint dynamics of a set of endogenous variables that comprise equity market returns, cross-border capital (equity, bond and bank credit) flows and international trade, while controlling for investor-fear risk, commodity market risk and U.S. long-term interest rates as exogenous or push factors. We test for the presence of causality from cross-border portfolio (equity and bond) flows, bank credit flows, and international trade towards worldwide equity market returns.
The analysis is conducted separately for capital flows and trade measured in gross and net terms. Moreover, the VAR coefficients are estimated using average data across countries  Eurozone advanced economies (EU), other advanced economies (OAE), emerging markets (EM), Asian and Latin American countries  and individual country data in order to obtain 14 An ancillary observation that also differentiates the EM group (and Latin American subgroup) from the other groups is that the cross-section variation in net bank credit and total net capital flows, as measured by the standard deviation across countries, increases very little from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period, or even decreases when we compare the last year pre-crisis and the first year of the crisis period.
panel coefficient estimates that accommodate full heterogeneity across countries.
The results from an eclectic VAR-based methodology that includes Granger causality tests, generalized impulse response functions and forecast error variance decompositions indicate that cross-border bank credit did play a predominant role in the transmission of the U.S.
financial crisis to worldwide equity markets. This finding is pervasive across country groups but the magnitude of the transmission effect from bank credit to equity market returns is stronger for EM countries. More clear-cut evidence is obtained when we measure capital flows and trade in net rather than gross terms. These findings are confirmed by various robustness tests redefining the endogenous and exogenous vectors of variables in the VAR models, measuring the equity indices in local currencies, weighing the countries according to equity market capitalization, and treating August 2007 as start date of the U.S. financial crisis.
The paper adds to a recent literature arguing that a side effect of the banking globalization phenomena is that cross-border bank credit flows have become, both on account of their size and reversibility, relatively more worrisome to risk managers (e.g., Acharya and Merrouche, 2012; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012a,b,c; Fuertes et al., 2015) . It also lends motivation to studies that seek to uncover the main determinants of the retrenchment in bank flows countryby-country during the crisis (Buch and Goldberg, 2014, and references therein) , and studies that propose bank flows as the main indicator of global liquidity (e.g., Bank for International Settlements, 2011). As regards to policy lessons, our findings endorse the efforts made by policymakers and international organizations to implement better surveillance of a market's external exposure to other markets, to encourage banks to implement more sound risk management as well as improved prudential banking regulations, together with capital controls.
Specifically, they support the IMF position that capital controls are a useful tool for managing flows and can be used, on a case-by-case basis, in appropriate circumstances (Ostry et al., 2010) .
There are some caveats to our investigation. Ideally, we should rely on an economic theory to capture the transmission of the U.S. financial crisis. In the absence of a generally accepted theory, we formulate VAR models to gauge the relative contributions of various plausible crisis transmission channels. We focus on equity markets and do not consider real estate markets as it is hard to find comparable house market price data for such a large cross-section of 36 developed and emerging markets and long time span. This is an avenue for future research. A natural limitation of our study in terms of policy lessons is that, of course, a future crisis could be triggered by a new segment of the capital markets and transmitted through different channels. Table I . Table III . VAR coefficients and Granger-causality tests. The table reports coefficients estimates of the equity returns (ret) equation corresponding to one-month lagged gross or net equity flow (gef or nef), gross or net bond flow (gbf/ nef), gross or net bank credit (gbc/nbc), and gross or net trade (gt/nt). The numbers in the second row (in italics) are t-statistics for the null hypothesis of 'no Granger-causality' from capital flows or trade to equity returns or that the corresponding coefficient of lagged capital flow or trade is zero. The VAR coefficients and covariance matrix are estimated by OLS. ** and *** in the shaded area indicate that the null hypothesis of no Granger-causality is rejected at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively, using the exact Student t distribution with T-k degrees of freedom where k=10 is the number of parameters in each equation. Left ( Table I . Table V . Robustness checks. The table shows OLS coefficients estimates for the equity returns (ret) equation corresponding to one-month lagged net equity flow (nef), net bond flow (nbf), net bank credit (nbc), and net trade (nt). The second row (italics) reports t-statistics for the null hypothesis of 'no Grangercausality' from capital flows or trade to equity returns or the restriction that the coefficient of the corresponding lagged capital flow or trade variable is zero. ** and *** in the shaded area indicate that the null hypothesis of no Granger-causality is rejected at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively, using the exact Student t distribution with T-(k+1) degrees of freedom where k is the number of estimated coefficients. Each panel corresponds to a robustness check as described in Section 4. All panels are based on monthly data from January 2007 to December 2012 averaged with equal weights across the countries in each group except Panel H which is based on corresponding equally-weighted average data from August 2007 to December 2012. The group countries are listed in Table I Table I for details) to December 2006. The crisis period runs from January 2007 to December 2012. The country name abbreviations are explained in Table I . 01 -79.42 -89.96 -0.27 -0.08 -11.34 -58.38 -69.80 -0.20 -0.53 -7.65 20.28 12.10 -0.05 -0.17 -24.38 -115.81 -140.37 -12.15 15.58 -56.02 -134.41 -174.84 -6.35 -14.84 -36.15 -43.23 -94.22 -2.58 -8.14 -30.38 63.91 25.39 3.47 -0.01 -2.03 -9.65 -11.70 -1.01 1.30 -4.67 -11.20 -14.57 -0.53 -1.24 -3.01 -3.60 -7.85 -0.22 -0.68 -2.53 44 -17.43 -131.57 -147.56 -30.42 17.46 -42.07 -170.93 -195.54 -28.89 -12.54 -34.59 -284.21 -331.33 -20.45 -3.72 -23.83 -147.50 -175.05 -8.88 0.13 -1.58 -11.96 -13.41 -2.77 1.59 -3.82 -15.54 -17.78 -2.63 -1.14 -3.14 -25.84 -30.12 -1.86 -0.34 -2.17 -13.41 -15.91 -0 20 -2.89 -60.86 -63.55 -8.74 -0.19 -9.39 -50.39 -59.96 -6.39 -0.05 -3.42 -15.41 -18.89 -3.46 0.07 -0.30 7.59 7.36 -0.59 0.04 -0.58 -12.17 -12.71 -1.75 -0.04 -1.88 -10.08 -11.99 -1.28 -0.01 -0.68 -3.08 -3.78 -0.69 
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